We employ a unique dataset to study the impact of foreign ownership and mode of foreign bank entry on banks' lending rates to transparent and opaque borrowers. We find that greenfield banks charge lower lending rates on average and we test for two hypotheses that can explain the lower cost of credit of these institutions: (1) superior performance or (2) different portfolio composition with a focus on more transparent borrowers. Our analysis shows that, ownership and mode of entry have a large impact on banks' portfolio composition in terms of borrowers, maturity, and currency. When we control for this, we find that greenfield banks charge lower lending rates to more transparent borrowers only. Banks that were acquired by foreign investors offer lower lending rates only on loans to individuals. JEL classification: G21, G28, G34, L11
Introduction
In the last two decades we have witnessed a high penetration of foreign banks into financial markets of transition and developing economies of Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The most dramatic change took place in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), where more than 70% of banking assets are now in the hands of foreign investors. This phenomenon has led to a heated debate about costs and benefits of foreign bank ownership.
The existing empirical evidence shows that lending rates of foreign banks, particularly those that enter the market via greenfield investment, are lower than those of domestic institutions (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2006) . However, this empirical finding can be interpreted in two different ways. First of all, lower lending rates of greenfield institutions can be explained by their superior performance. This is consistent with Berger's (2000) global advantage hypothesis, according to which some efficiently managed foreign institutions are able to overcome cross-border disadvantages and operate more efficiently than the domestic institutions in other nations. We attribute this effect to "performance hypothesis".
At the same time, policymakers have often accused foreign banks of "cherry picking" the best borrowers. This argument has been formalized by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) and Sengupta (2007) . Both papers model the tradeoff between a cost-advantage for foreign entrants versus informational advantage for incumbent banks. For example, Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2004) argue that foreign banks have advantages in targeting more transparent new clients (transactions-based lending), whereas domestic banks are better placed to lend to firms based on soft information (relationship lending). Sengupta (2007) shows that, with a sufficient cost-advantage for foreign entrants, incumbent banks retain more risky borrowers whereas foreign entrants tend to lend more to large, transparent firms. Taking into account that lending rates in market segments for more transparent clients are lower due to higher competitiveness of these segments, the lower lending rates of greenfield banks could be related to their specific portfolio composition tilted towards large corporations. We call this the "portfolio composition" hypothesis and indeed, there is some empirical evidence that foreign-owned banks are less likely to lend to informationally opaque small businesses than domestically-owned banks (Berger et al., 2001; Clarke et al., 2005) .
The portfolio composition effect can additionally manifest itself in other dimensions of the loan contract such as collateral requirements -as modeled by Sengupta (2007) , the maturity and currency structure of loans. In the last years, loans in foreign currencies have gained popularity in a number of transition countries due to their perceived lower costs. Indeed, interest rates on loans in domestic currencies have been higher than the ones in foreign currencies in most transition economies and borrowers -willing to take on foreign exchange and interest rate risks -have preferred to take loans denominated in foreign currencies. In some countries appreciation of the domestic currency made loans in foreign currency appear even cheaper. Foreign banks are often blamed for the supply of foreign currency denominated loans, since they have a better access to international capital markets and to their parent institutions.
There is also a widely held concern that foreign bank lending involves short-term "hot" money that is readily retracted during crises. For example, Dooley and Shin (2000) argue that foreign creditors' run from Korean banks triggered the crisis in Korea in 1997. In the paper, we do not discuss the pros and cons of capital inflows by foreign banks. However, we would like to control for loan maturity since it might have a significant impact on lending rate, which we discuss later in the paper.
Foreign banks' behavior is heavily influenced by their mode of entry. This is why we choose to differentiate between foreign banks that entered the market via greenfield investment (greenfield banks) and foreign banks that acquired an existing domestic institution (takeover banks). Due to the burden of old loans and inherited organizational structure, takeover banks might be slow to render the acquired institution more efficient. At the same time, since greenfield banks start their operations from scratch, they are especially disadvantaged in their access to soft information, whereas takeover banks possess relationships with incumbent firms. Both arguments lead to the situation where greenfield banks would offer lower lending rates, however it is impossible at this stage to explain whether this comes from "performance" or "portfolio composition" effects.
The effect of bank ownership on the cost of credit for different types of borrowers is an important question, since high lending rates might be prohibitive for some borrowers, which might damage economic growth. Calvo and Coricelli (1993) , for example, argue that the credit contraction in Central and Eastern Europe can explain partly the heavy decline in output in this region in the period [1989] [1990] . Therefore, the observed lower interest rates of foreign banks might speak in favor of removing entry barriers for foreign banks. However, we would like to test whether foreign banks charge lower lending rates to all borrowers, or only to large transparent firms at the expense of opaque small entrepreneurs which may continue to suffer from the informational capture of incumbent banks. Supply of credit to small firms is very important, especially for transition economies. Carlin and Richthofen (1995) , for example, find that the rapid growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and the availability of sufficient external funding, has contributed to the integration of the former East and West Germany.
To our knowledge there has been no attempt to distinguish between "performance" and "portfolio composition" hypotheses for lending rates of banks with different ownership structure and mode of entry. The reason for this lies in the lack of data on the composition of banks' loan portfolios. In this study we aim to fill this gap by using a unique database of detailed information on Polish banks, provided by the National Bank of Poland. Our dataset contains quarterly information on all Polish banks for the period between December 1996 and December 2006. In addition to traditional information from balance sheets and income statements, we have information about interest income, amount, currency and maturity of loans for the following types of clients: private firms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), entrepreneurs, individuals, and farmers. In the paper we focus on the differences between foreign and domestic banks. Additionally, we differentiate between two modes of foreign bank entry, namely acquisition of a domestic institution and a greenfield investment. Finally, we also control for state bank ownership.
The Polish banking market constitutes a good testing ground for the performance and portfolio composition hypotheses. Currently the share of foreign investors in Polish banks amounts to 74 percent, and banks of all types of ownership and mode of entry are represented. Poland is home to the largest banking industry among new EU members, it carries many characteristics of other banking markets in CEECs, and it did not experience financial distress in the analyzed period.
Our results show that the mode of foreign banks' entry is an important determinant of lending rates. More specifically, we find that only the greenfield mode of entry has a negative impact on average lending rates. However, a closer examination reveals that the portfolio composition drives this result as greenfield banks offer lower lending rates only to more transparent borrowers, whereas their lending rates to opaque clients are not significantly different from those offered by domestic private banks. These results hold even after accounting for other loan characteristics such as maturity and currency denomination.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes theoretical considerations and reviews the existing empirical literature. In Section 3 we present our data and compute descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes our empirical findings and Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical considerations and existing empirical evidence
Most of empirical studies for developing and transition countries show that greenfield banks succeed in charging lower lending rates and spreads than domestic banks and foreign banks that entered via acquisitions (takeover banks). Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) study banking markets in five Latin American countries during the late 1990s and find that foreign banks have lower spreads than domestic banks and takeover banks have higher spreads than greenfield banks. Claeys and Hainz (2006) document that greenfield banks charge the lowest lending rates in ten CEECs. These empirical findings can be explained by two main complementary hypotheses. Berger et al. (2000) formulates the global advantage or performance hypothesis, according to which some efficiently managed foreign institutions are able to overcome cross-border disadvantages (distance, monitoring costs, differences in institutional environment, language and culture, etc) and operate more efficiently than their domestic competitors. These organizations may have higher efficiency when operating in other nations by spreading their superior managerial skills or best-practice policies and procedures over more resources, thus lowering costs. They may also raise revenues through superior investment or risk management skills, by providing better service quality/variety that some customers prefer, or by obtaining diversification of risks that allows them to undertake higher risk-higher expected return investments.
The "performance" effect should be especially strong for foreign banks entering transition economies that have nascent banking markets characterized by low competition and efficiency. Indeed, there are a number of studies that show that foreign banks have higher efficiency (Bonin, et al. 2005; Weill, 2003) , experience faster and more stable loan growth (De Haas and Lelyveld, 2006) , and enjoy higher profitability than domestic banks (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2006) . Most of these studies also show that greenfield banks exhibit a particularly superior performance due to the fact that they did not inherit bad loans and inefficient organizational structures. This is not the case for takeover banks which need transitional time in order to modernize their lending practices and clean up loan portfolio which is left from previous owners. There is even some anecdotal evidence that some foreign owners do not reform the acquired institution immediately after the purchase, but only after it starts experiencing problems.
Foreign banks in transition economies compared to domestic banks additionally benefit from their better access to international capital markets and funding from their parent companies. This should diminish their cost of funds, which in turn should be translated into lower lending rates benefiting the borrower. Moreover, foreign banks might enjoy lower cost of deposits due to their superior reputation.
Hypothesis 1: Performance hypothesis. Foreign banks charge lower interest rates due to their comparative advantages in efficiency, risk management, corporate governance, and cost of funding. Greenfield banks might charge additionally lower rates because they are not burdened by old non-performing loans and inefficient organizational structures.
Even though foreign banks use superior lending techniques and may enjoy cost advantages as reflected in the performance hypothesis, a number of researchers have argued that foreign entry will actually produce heterogeneous impacts across borrower groups. In particular, they show that the impact of foreign bank entry will be more pronounced for transparent borrowers. Foreign banks should lend more to large transparent enterprises based on hard information and less to opaque firms that can only provide soft information (Berger et al., 2001) 1 . Moreover, foreign banks are better suited to lend to multinational corporations from their home countries.
Besides having an ability to use soft information, foreign banks, and in particular greenfield institutions, might be less willing to do so. This idea is proposed by Stein (2002) who argues that organizations with more hierarchical structures are more likely to rely on hard information as opposed to organizations with flatter structures. The reason is that flatter organizations have better control and information on their managers, and thus can afford to give them more discretion, which allows them to use soft information. Berger et al. (2005) explains the logic of the Stein's model with a banking example. In small banks, managers know that they have control of their capital and funds and their research of local lending opportunities will be rewarded. Therefore, they invest a lot of time in collecting soft information, whose quality is a function of incentives. In large banks, local subsidiaries might have fewer incentives to collect soft information, because the capital allocation decisions are done in the headquarters, where it might be decided to reallocate capital to a different subsidiary because overall lending opportunities are better there. A local subsidiary cannot credibly communicate soft information and therefore its efforts are wasted. Ex ante, this implies that managers do less research in a hierarchical setting.
The modeling in Stein (2002) and Berger et al. (2005) can be easily applied to foreign banks, which are usually part of large multinational banking groups, and where communication of soft information is obstructed not only by the hierarchy, but also by cultural and linguistic barriers. We can also assume that funds are more easily moved to/from greenfield institutions than takeover banks that have large deposit networks and are thus more independent in their financing. This would additionally diminish the 1 Hard and soft information differ with respect to the degree of transferability. Thus, hard information on the other hand refers to credible and publicly verifiable data, such as a firms' balance sheets, credit history, collateral and guarantees. On the other hand, soft information cannot be verified by a third person and is gained a result of the relationship between a bank and a borrower. For example, through repeated interviews with an owner of a young firm, a bank manager might be convinced that the firm's owner is a smart, honest and hard working entrepreneur with a high probability of success. However, this soft information cannot be transferred to other potential lenders (Petersen, 2004). incentives of managers of greenfield institutions to invest time in gathering soft information and engaging in relationship lending.
Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2004) show that lending rates on loans to transparent borrowers are lower than those for opaque clients. This can be explained by the differences in the borrowers' elasticity of demand for credit, as transparent borrowers have a more elastic demand because they can signal their information to outside lenders. This leads to higher competition and, thus, lower cost of funds for large transparent firms. Opaque firms, on the other hand, cannot signal their worth and are captured by their creditors leading to higher borrowing costs for them. Sengupta (2007) builds on Dell'Ariccia and Marquez to show that foreign banks may also use other dimensions of loan contracts to partially overcome asymmetric information. In particular, with a sufficient cost-advantage for foreign entrants, incumbent banks retain more risky borrowers whereas foreign entrants tend to lend more to large, transparent firms by requiring collateral.
The above two results -the fact that foreign banks would prefer to lend to more transparent borrowers and that lending rates for this type of client is lower -could explain why we observe a negative impact of foreign bank ownership on lending rates. We can additionally hypothesize that greenfield banks have the best comparative advantage in lending to transparent clients, whereas foreign banks that entered via acquisition of domestic institutions also possess access to soft information and skills to lend to more opaque customers which allows them to extract rents (Claeys and Hainz, 2006) . This would mean that greenfield banks would offer lower lending rates than takeover banks for transparent borrowers and will aim to shy away from opaque borrowers where soft information is important.
Hypothesis 2. Portfolio Composition hypothesis. Foreign banks have lower lending rates due to different composition of their portfolios. Greenfield banks in particular have a lot of advantages in processing hard information and less motivation to engage in lending relationship. As a result, they target transparent institutions and charge them lower interest rates. In contrast, domestic banks have comparative advantages in lending to opaque firms based on soft information, which allows them to extract larger rents from those borrowers.
The proposed two hypotheses -performance and portfolio composition -are not mutually exclusive and can reinforce each other. Indeed, the theoretical models of Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2004) , Claeys and Hainz (2006) and Sengupta (2007) , that analyze the differences between foreign and domestic banks in terms of information, are based on the assumption that foreign banks are more cost-efficient and have superior ability to screen new customers than domestic banks. A sufficient performance advantage is a prerequisite to observe the portfolio composition effect.
The existing empirical studies do not directly test the above hypotheses. However, there is some evidence that, indeed, foreign banks lend less to opaque firms, such as small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Berger et al. (2001) test this idea on the Argentinean credit registry that contains information on individual businesses and find that small firms are less likely to have a loan from a foreign-owned bank. Clarke et al. (2005) verify the same hypothesis on a sample of Latin American banks and find very similar results.
At the same time there are some arguments according to which foreign bank ownership should not lead to any bias in these banks' credit supply toward large corporations. Berger and Udell (2006) argue that the common assumption that foreign banks have a comparative advantage in transactions lending technologies and comparative disadvantage in relationship lending does not necessarily imply that they are disadvantaged in providing credit to informationally opaque SMEs. On the contrary, advances in credit scoring methodologies coupled with enhanced computer power and increased data availability make transaction lending technologies to be well suited for funding small firms (Mester, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 2002) . This is especially true when credit scores are based on the owner's personal consumer data obtained from consumer credit bureaus, which is combined with data on the SME collected by the financial institutions.
De Haas and Naaborg (2006) conduct focused interviews with managers of foreign parent banks and their affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe and document that foreign banks even expanded into SME and retail markets. Giannetti and Ongena (2007) use firm level data and find that foreign bank presence in Central and Eastern Europe stimulates growth of financial loans, and even though large firms benefit more from foreign lending, smaller companies profit as well. This, however, may stem from more competition in banking markets pushing domestic banks to specialize more into small firm lending.
Data and descriptive statistics
We test our hypotheses using a unique dataset that was kindly provided by the National Bank of Poland. It contains quarterly information on 110 Polish banks 2 between December 1996 and December 2006. In addition to standard information from balance sheets and income statements (like bank assets, capitalization, costs and profits), it contains data on interest income, amount of granted loans, amount of mortgages, and non-performing loans for five borrower types: private firms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), individual entrepreneurs, private individuals, and farmers 3 . Each borrower type is precisely defined in the Polish law: private firms are firms owned by private investors (either entirely, or where the private share exceeds 50%) and are subject to commercial law or are subject to civil law and employ more than 9 workers; SOEs are firms owned either directly by the state or by other public company (either entirely, or where the state share exceeds 50%); individual entrepreneurs are small firms employing up to 9 workers and subject to civil law; and farmers are private persons that derive most of their income from agriculture. This division gives us a unique opportunity to construct effective interest rates for each borrower type separately.
We can rank the different groups according to their degree of transparency. Private firms are the most transparent borrowers, whereas entrepreneurs and farmers are the most opaque ones. Individuals might lack a credit history (which makes them opaque), but they usually borrow by providing a good collateral (which makes them more transparent). The degree of transparency of SOEs depends on local regulation and its implementation. The division is presented in Diagram 1.
The Polish banking sector provides a good testing ground for our hypotheses, because similar to other CEECs, it experienced massive foreign direct investments. However, the Polish case is particularly interesting, because it has the largest economy and market potential among new EU member states in terms of GDP and population.
The entry of foreign banks into the Polish banking market has been happening together with banks' privatization and can be divided in four phases:
In the first phase between 1989 and 1992 establishing a new bank was very easy and many new private banks were created, as well as many foreign banks entered the market via greenfield investments.
During the second phase between 1993 and 1997 privatization of state-owned banks started, but only minority shares were sold to fragmented shareholders, while the State Treasury retained control of banks. During this time foreign banks could receive a banking license only if they bailed-out a loss-making or low-profitability bank.
The third phase was characterized by the swift privatization of the remaining major state-owned banks in 1998-1999. The privatization method was different as Polish authorities sold a majority interest to selected foreign strategic investors. Currently, there are still four banks under control of the State Treasury including the largest Polish bank, PKO BP.
After 2000 there have been a few more acquisitions of private banks by foreign investors. The largest increase in foreign banks numbers, however, stems from the entry of greenfield foreign institutions, which became easier since Poland's the entry into the EU in 2004 which introduced the single license principle.
At the end of 2006, the share of foreign investors in Polish banking constitutes 74 percent. This is less than in other major CEECs countries, such as Hungary with more than 80 percent of banking assets in foreign hands, and Czech Republic and Slovakia were foreign banks control more than 95 percent of assets. Relatively smaller presence of foreign banks in Poland gives us an additional strong argument to use Poland as a case study, since there are still local private and state-owned banks left which we can use as a benchmark.
Figures 1 and 2 provide information about the number of banks and their market shares with respect to their ownership and mode of entry: private domestic banks, state-owned domestic banks, greenfield foreign banks and takeover foreign banks. In each case, we use a threshold of 50% in order to designate a bank to a specific ownership group. For example, a bank is called state if more than 50 percent of its capital is owned by the state. A foreign bank is considered greenfield if it has established its operations in Poland as a new institution, and takeover if it has acquired an existing institution. We observe that the role of domestic institutions, both private and state-owned, has declined, whereas the number of takeover banks and their market share have increased significantly. The number of greenfield banks has increased as well, but their market share has remained stable in the analyzed period.
During 1996-2006, there were a number of domestic mergers and acquisitions in the Polish banking sector, hence we treat merged institutions as two before the merger and as one afterwards 4 . For our estimations we have deleted the four first quarters of operations for both greenfield and takeover banks in order to exclude the initial setting-up and transformation period.
In Figure 3 we present the share of each type of borrower in banks' portfolios. This figure confirms our expectations, i.e. banks' ownership structure significantly influences the types of clients that this bank targets. This is particularly evident for greenfield banks that primarily target the most transparent borrowers, i.e. private firms, even thought their share has declined from 80 percent of loan portfolio in 1996 to 56 percent ten years later. However, with time they also started to give loans to individuals, and this share in the total portfolio increased from 12 percent in 1996 to 34 percent in 2006. State-owned banks extend more loans to SOEs than other banks (16 percent of their loan portfolio in 2006), but their share is declining (possibly also due to the on-going privatization process of firms). The share of loans to individuals has increased in portfolios of all banks, but they have the largest weight in takeover and state-owned banks. Domestic private banks lend more to opaque firms, such as individual entrepreneurs and farmers -which confirms our expectations that domestic private banks have comparative advantages in lending to small non-transparent businesses. Their share represents 27 percent of all loans of domestic private banks. In contrast, opaque borrowers constitute only 8 percent of foreign banks' loans, and even less so for state-owned banks. Figure 4 shows the maturity composition of banks' portfolios. We define loans with maturity up to one year as short-term loans, between one and five years as medium-term loans, and above five years as long-term loans. We find that maturity of loans has increased significantly in all types of banks, and currently more than 40 percent of loans are granted for the period above 5 years in all banks, except for greenfield institutions. There is an indication that loan maturity of foreign banks, particularly greenfield institutions, is shorter than this of domestic banks. This is in line with frequent fears that foreign banks bring short-term money which can be easily reversed in case of economic distress. Interestingly, state-owned banks have the largest share of long-term loans, which might be explained by less stringent portfolio management techniques and their lower volatility of deposits due to implicit government guarantees.
Next we turn to currency composition of loan portfolios for different types of banks. As expected, foreign banks give more loans in foreign currency than domestic banks, which is probably due to their better access to international capital markets and parent companies. At the same time, loans in foreign currency peaked in 2000-2003 when 30 and 36 percent of loans of takeover and greenfield banks, respectively, were issued in foreign currency, and their importance has declined afterwards.
In Table 1 we present variable definitions, and in Table 2 we report descriptive statistics for the variables that we employ in our regression analysis. Based on our data, we are able to calculate not only the interest rates for different types of borrowers, but also banks' individual market shares and the Herfindahl index for the five segments separately. In addition we have information about maturity and currency of loans with respect to borrower type.
Our calculations of interest rates charged by banks of different types of ownership and mode of entry show that greenfield banks charge the lowest interest rates, whereas private domestic banks charge the highest. Takeover banks offer lower lending rates than both types of domestic banks, but charge more than the rates of greenfield institutions. These descriptive statistics are in line with the existing literature and all differences between the interest rates are statistically significant.
Next we compare interest rates on loans to different types of borrowers: private firms, SOEs, entrepreneurs, individuals, and farmers. The lowest lending rates are charged to private firms -the most transparent borrowers -and this difference is statistically significant with respect to all other types of borrowers. This is in line with the theoretical considerations that lending rates in the competitive markets with the smallest informational asymmetries should be the lowest.
Taking into account borrower composition of banks' portfolios and different lending rates for these borrowers, we can already make preliminary conclusions and make an attempt to explain the differences in the average lending rates charged by banks with different types of ownership. For example, lower lending rates of greenfield banks appear to be the result of their loan portfolio composition, i.e. heavy focus on markets with the lowest degree of information asymmetry (private firms), and highest share of loans granted in foreign currencies (which would be the cheapest). On the other hand, higher lending rates of private banks could be due to the fact that they give loans to farmers and entrepreneurs, the most opaque borrowers which bring the highest rents.
Methodology and empirical findings

Baseline model
First of all, we estimate a baseline lending rate model with specification similar to other studies, so that we can compare these results with the existing literature (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2006) . In this specification, we use lending rate for all borrowers as a dependent variable and examine the effect of bank ownership and mode of entry on costs of loans for an average borrower, controlling for bank characteristics, macroeconomic environment and market structure.
To be more formal, we estimate the following model: Currency -ratio of loans in foreign exchange in the portfolio. In addition, we include seasonal dummies. All variable definitions are given in Table 1 .
There is a potential problem with the above specification. The literature has shown that bank ownership has a large impact on bank performance which we capture by bank specific variables (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2006; De Haas and Lelyveld, 2006; Havrylchyk, 2006; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2007) . Therefore, ownership dummies and bank characteristic variables are not independent and cannot be included together as explanatory variables. In response to this problem, we implement a two-stage model where bank characteristics are estimated in a first stage regression before estimating equation (1). We model bank characteristics as a function of bank ownership and mode of entry:
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The residuals from this regression contains information about bank characteristic that is orthogonal to bank ownership and can be used in regression (1) instead of bank characteristic variables 5 .
Since our dataset is in panel version, initially we have to choose between panel and pooled estimation methods. The former, however, presents significant problems: while the Hausman tests indicates that we should allow for unobserved fixed effects in the error term, fixed effects estimation does not allow us to estimate the time-invariant coefficients (i.e. effect of greenfield ownership). In the same time, random effect estimation will produce inconsistent parameter estimates. Consequently, we opt for a pooled model. We estimate our regressions using Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors methodology, allowing for heterogeneity and autoregressive process of order 1 in the standard errors.
The results of estimating (1) and employing (2) are presented in the first column of Table  3 . We find that greenfield banks charge 1.3 percent less per quarter to their borrowers, whereas takeover banks do not charge less than domestic private institutions. Among bank specific variables, the deviation from the median non-performing loans, capitalization, and market share are significant and have the expected sign. Banks that hold large equity ratios and face higher credit risk are more likely to have higher lending rates. Large banks appear to reap economies of scale which they translate to their customers in the form of lower lending rates. In addition, higher share of mortgages in banks' portfolios reduces an average lending rate. Our findings corroborate previous finding in the literature (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2006) , which documents that greenfield institutions charge lower spreads or lending rates to their borrowers. However, none of these studies can assess welfare gains of the observed lower cost of credit. The disadvantage of the above model is the lack of information on borrower type, which does not allow us to separate the reasons for lower lending rates of greenfield banks, i.e. their superior performance or their portfolio composition targeted to more transparent borrowers.
Specifications for each borrower type
To test the portfolio composition hypothesis, we estimate model (1) for five types of borrowers: private firms, SOEs, entrepreneurs, individuals, and farmers. As it was mentioned in Section 3 we can divide them into three subgroups: transparent (private firms), semi-transparent (SOEs and individuals), and opaque (entrepreneurs and farmers). When we estimate our five models with homogeneous borrowers in each sample, the composition effect is removed from our estimations and we succeed to observe the pure effect of bank ownership and mode of entry on lending rates. It should be additionally stressed that our data allows us to compute market structure variables, non-performing loans, and the share of mortgages separately for each borrower type.
In columns 2-6 of Table 3 we present results separately for each type of borrower. Our findings show that the degree of borrower transparency is a very important factor in the analysis of the impact of bank ownership on lending rates. In line with the portfolio composition hypothesis, we find that greenfield banks charge lower interest rates only to transparent and semitransparent borrowers, such as private firms, SOEs and individuals. In these market segments, they charge 1.2-2.4 percent less than domestic private banks per quarter. Our results show that the mode of entry of foreign banks is also an important determinant of lending rates as takeover banks succeed to charge lower interest rates only to individuals.
Lower lending rates to individuals charged by greenfield and takeover banks also support the argument of Berger and Udell (2006) , that foreign banks are not necessarily disadvantaged in providing credit to all small borrowers. It appears that foreign banks provide a lot of credit to individuals and at a lower cost than domestic private banks. Even though most individual borrowers do not have a credit history, banks rely on information from credit bureaus that collect data on not only credit delinquencies, but also any kind of non-repayment for house utilities. This allows foreign banks to use credit scoring methodology at which they have a comparative advantage.
Since we have included bank specific variables in our specification, we can already exclude some greenfield bank characteristics for lower lending rates, such as lower share of non-performing loans, lower costs, and higher capitalization. Therefore, our greenfield dummy captures other "performance" effects for which we cannot control, such as more aggressive pricing strategy, sounder corporate governance, superior risk management 6 , better access to foreign funding, reputation, etc.
Specification controlling for loan maturity
The cost of credit can additionally depend on its maturity, but its impact is ambiguous as it reflects two opposite effects. A borrower that issues short-term debt can face costly liquidations at expiration which motivates him to opt for longer-term debt. At the same time, lenders prefer to give short term loans because of agency problems, such as asset substitution and underinvestment. As a result, borrowers are willing to incur and lenders demand higher lending rates for loans with longer maturity. Alternatively, lenders might ration credit to risky borrowers and force them to take short-term loans, which would decrease average lending rates on long-term loans. Empirical evidence supports both hypotheses for corporate loans and bonds (Gottesman and Roberts, 2004; Helwege and Turner, 1999) . For an individual firm the spread typically increases with maturity, reflecting increasing uncertainty. At the same time, safer firms tend to issue longer-dated bonds or are able to have access to long term bank credit, which causes the average spread to decline with maturity.
The situation in Poland is additionally complicated because yield curves were downwardsloping till 2003, reflecting market expectations of diminishing inflation and interest rated convergence to the EU level. Short-term interest rates declined dramatically from 20.6% at the end of 1996 till 5.7% in 2003, with a yield curve taking an upward shape after 2003
7 . In such economic environment, firms would agree to take long-term loans only if they had lower interest rate than short-term ones.
To control for loan maturity we should augment our model with variables that control for the share of short-term and long-term loans in banks' portfolios. However, the banks' decision to lend short-term might depend on its ownership. There is a widely held concern that foreign bank lending involves short-term "hot" money that is readily retracted during crises. We have shown already in Section 3 that on average greenfield banks extend loans of lower maturity. Therefore, our ownership and mode of entry variables (State, Takeover and Greenfield) and maturity variables (Short-term loans and Long-term loans) are not independent and cannot be put into one regression simultaneously.
In response to this problem, we again implement a two-stage model where maturity variables are estimated in a first stage regression before estimating equation (1). We model share of short-term and long-term loans as a function of bank ownership and mode of entry:
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The residuals from these regressions contain maturity information that is orthogonal to bank ownership characteristics and can be used as additional explanatory variables in regression (1).
First-stage results of estimation of model (3) are presented in Table 4 . They show that the relationship between loan maturity and bank ownership is not simple and depends on the type of borrower. For example, while it is true that greenfield banks lend short-term to private firms, they also extend more long-term loans to individuals than domestic private banks.
Second-stage findings of estimation of model (1) are presented in Table 5 . Our results show that maturity is not significant for all borrowers, but in general, we observe that banks with larger share of long term loans charge lower lending rates. In the model with entrepreneurs, banks with higher share of short-term loans are able to charge higher interest rates, which might reflect higher risk of start-ups and their exclusion from longterm loan funds.
When we look at the impact of foreign bank ownership and the mode of entry on lending rates after controlling for loan maturity, our results do not change significantly. We still find that lending rates that greenfield banks charge to transparent borrowers are lower than the rates charged by private banks. The impact of Takeover variable on lending rate to individuals becomes significant at 1 percent level, confirming our previous result that takeover banks really have a comparative advantage in lending to individuals.
Specification controlling for currency denomination
One of the characteristics of many CEECs is the high proportion of loans denominated in foreign currency. Their share ranges from around 10-20 percent in Czech Republic and Slovakia to 60-70 percent in the Baltic states. As we saw in Figure 5 , in 2006 Polish banks extended 23 percent of their loans in foreign currency, which is not very high in comparison to other countries. Still, this poses significant risks for the banking sector, as many borrowers are not hedged against currency and interest rate risks 8 .
Currency composition of loan portfolios is an important determinant of lending rates. In fact the popularity of loans denominated in foreign currencies stems from lower lending rates that are charged on this type of loans. Clearly this interest rate advantage represents compensation for the inherent foreign exchange risk. However, survey undertaken in 11 CEECs shows that most borrowers, particularly households and small and medium entrepreneurs, are not aware of this risk (ECB, 2006) . This is due to historically low exchange rate volatility in some countries, which created a belief in de facto low foreign exchange rate risk. The willingness to borrow in foreign currency is additionally enhanced by appreciation of the local currency which is also true for Poland.
To control for currency denomination, we augment our model with a variable that controls for the share of loans in foreign currency in banks' portfolios. Similar to maturity, the ability and willingness of banks to supply loans in foreign currency depends primarily on their access to foreign funds and/or hedging opportunities 9 . In this respect foreign banks have an advantage over domestically-owned banks, since they have better access to international capital markets, including their own parent banks. Figure 5 shows that in Poland greenfield and takeover banks have the largest proportion of loans in foreign currency, whereas state-owned banks -the lowest.
In response to this problem, we again implement a two-stage model where Foreign Currency variable is estimated in a first stage regression before estimating equation (1). We model share of loans in foreign currency as a function of bank ownership and mode of entry:
8 Interestingly many loans in foreign currencies are extended in Swiss Francs, on which lending rates are even lower than on Euro loans. This characteristics is shared by other countries in CEECs, such as Hungary and Slovenia. This trend comes from Austria where most of loans in foreign currency are denominated in Swiss Franc. Originally this was constrained to regions bordering Switzerland where firms and individuals had a natural hedge against currency risk since their profits and income were often in Swiss Franc. However, now lending in Swiss Franc is extended to other part of Austria and to CEECs where Austrian banks have a strong presence. 9 Very often foreign currency loans are extended in domestic currency but have all the characteristics of foreign currency loans, namely interest rate and exchange rate risks. In this case banks do not have to have access to foreign currency funding, but rather they should be able to hedge their exposure to foreign currency risk. 
The residual from this regression contains currency information that is orthogonal to ownership characteristics and can be used in regression (1) instead of Foreign Currency variable.
The results of first stage regression (4) are presented in Table 6 . We find, that foreign banks, particularly greenfield institutions, extend less loans in domestic currency. The results of second-stage regression are shown in Table 7 . As expected, Foreign Currency variable has a negative sign, indicating that loans in foreign currency are on average less expensive than loans in local currency. However, this fact has no significant impact on our final results, which show that even after controlling for loan maturity and currency (1) greenfield banks charge lower lending rates to more transparent borrowers; (2) takeover banks charge lower interest rates to individuals.
To sum up our results, we find that mode of entry is an important determinant of banks' lending rates, as only greenfield banks charge lower lending rates than domestic private banks. However, more detailed analysis reveals that only transparent borrowers benefit from these lower lending rates, whereas opaque borrowers obtain the same lending rates in banks of all types of ownership and mode of entry. Still, the fact, that at least some borrowers receive lower lending rates from foreign banks is in line with out "performance" hypothesis.
Estimations with intermediation margins
Up to now, we have focused our analysis on lending rates. As an alternative, it is interesting to see the impact of foreign bank ownership on intermediation margins as well, since this is an indicator of the costs of intermediation of funds between depositors and borrowers. Moreover, lending rates depend on cost of fund for banks, thus we might find an additional source of lower lending rates besides our portfolio composition and performance hypotheses.
We compute five intermediation margins as differences between lending rates for each type of borrower and the average deposit rate for each bank. We estimate models with intermediation margins as dependent variables using second-stage model, and the results of our exercise are presented in Table 10 . We additionally estimate a model with deposit rate as a dependent variable and these finding are presented in the last column of Table  10 .
Our findings show that greenfield banks have lower interest spreads only in case of semitransparent borrowers. In contrast to our previous findings, we do not find anymore that greenfield banks charge lower spreads to the most transparent borrowers, i.e. private firms. We also find that greenfield banks can offer lower interest rate to depositors, which could be the reward for their higher solvency and a belief that they would be bailed out by their parent banks in case of trouble. This appears to explain lower lending rates charges by greenfield banks to private firms.
Findings for state-owned banks
While we primarily focus on foreign banks in our study, we think that it is also worthwhile to consider our findings for state-owned banks. Our results show that stateowned banks charge lower lending rates than private banks for private firms, individuals, and farmers. This is in contrast to the prevailing view among economist that state-owned banks have poor incentives to minimize costs, suffer from political interference and moral hazard from soft budget constraints, which leads to bad lending decisions. Mian (2006) analyze performance of different types of banks and conclude that state-owned banks are less profitable and have lower capitalization than private banks, despite their lower deposit costs. La Porta et al. (2002) investigate the impact of state bank ownership on the economy and find that it is associated with slower subsequent development of the financial system, lower economic growth and, in particular, lower growth of productivity.
In line with this view, the lending rates of state-owned banks should be higher than those of private banks, and it is interesting to understand why we have the opposite results.
There is also a benign interpretation of state-owned banks, which are viewed as relevant for country's development. According to this view, state-owned banks give out loss making loans to subsidize "social projects" and therefore we can expect lower lending rates for certain borrowers, such as farmers. This effect would be enhanced due to the perception that state-owned banks are more stable and would be bailed out by the government in case of trouble, which allows them to have low cost of deposits. Our results are partly in line with this discussion, since we find that state-owned banks offer lower lending rates for farmers.
They can offer lower interest rates to their depositors, but this explains their lower lending rates only in case of farmers. When we estimate interest spread regressions we still observe that state-owned banks extend cheaper loans to private firms and individuals than private banks. Therefore, an alternative explanation for lower lending rates of state-owned banks is their acceptance of lower profits, since their main shareholder is the state.
Conclusions
Our results provide support to the hypothesis that foreign banks, particularly greenfield ones, are more willing to extend loans to transparent borrowers (e.g. large private firms), albeit their share has fallen from 80 percent of loan portfolio of greenfield banks in 1996 to around 56 ten years later. At the same time domestic private banks specialize in loans to non-transparent borrowers, such as small entrepreneurs and farmers. Their share represents 27 percent of all loans of domestic private banks. In contrast, opaque borrowers constitute only 8 percent of foreign banks' loans, and even less so for stateowned banks.
We also find that foreign banks, particularly greenfield ones, are more prone to extend loans in foreign currency, even though the share of these loans has been declining recently. Contrary to existing concerns, we cannot conclude that that foreign banks bring "hot" money which they can rapidly withdraw. Again, the mode of entry plays a big role and greenfield banks have on average shorter loan maturity. However, even this relationship breaks down when we look at the level of different borrower segments, since it persists only for the most transparent borrowers. Other borrowers, have the same (or even longer) loan maturity when they borrow at greenfield institutions than from domestic private banks.
In our paper we analyze the impact of bank ownership and mode of entry on lending rates of banks. In line with the existing literature we find that the average lending rate of greenfield banks is lower than that of domestic private institutions and we find only a limited impact of foreign banks that entered via acquisitions. However, only more transparent borrowers benefit from lower lending rates. Our results are robust even when we control for portfolio composition with respect to currency, loan maturity, and share of mortgages. At the same time, takeover banks offer lower interest rates only to individuals, which appear to benefit the most from foreign bank presence notwithstanding their mode of entry.
We also provide interesting findings with respect to state-owned banks, who also succeed to offer lower lending rates to certain groups of borrowers. Interestingly, they charge lower cost of credit to different types of borrowers notwithstanding their level of transparency. Surprisingly, borrowers that we would expect to benefit the most from the state bank ownership -SOEs -do not obtain lower lending rates in state-owned banks. Our findings also show that lower lending rates of state-owned banks are only partly due to their better access to cheap deposits. Our alternative explanation rests on the assumption that they are more likely to accept lower profit margins because they are owned by the State Treasury.
Table1. Variable definition
Variable Definition State A dummy variable which takes the value of one if more than 50 percent of the bank is owned by the state. Takeover A dummy variable which takes the value of one if more than 50 percent of the bank is owned by the foreign investor, which entered the market via acquisition of an existing bank. Greenfield A dummy variable which takes the value of one if more than 50 percent of the bank is owned by the foreign investor, which entered the market via establishing a new bank.
Lending rate
The ratio of interest income on net loans. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Interest spread, Herfindahl Index, Market Share, In PLN, Short-term and Long-term variables are calculated separately for each type of borrower. In each regression we control for seasonal fluctuations. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Interest spread, Herfindahl Index, Market Share, In PLN, Short-term and Long-term variables are calculated separately for each type of borrower. In each regression we control for seasonal fluctuations. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Interest spread, Herfindahl Index, Market Share, In PLN, Short-term and Long-term variables are calculated separately for each type of borrower. In each regression we control for seasonal fluctuations. 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 greenfield takeover state private
